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This book is unique in that it comprises two aspects of the oceans: ‘the personal experience 
of a mariner at sea’ and ‘the geopolitics of the oceans and how they constantly influence 
events ashore’. Thus, the author’s contention is the theme of the book —‘the oceans drive the 
international system’ (pp. ?-?). The author, Admiral James Stavridis, is a retired US naval oﬃcer 
with substantial experience and knowledge of the world’s oceans and US naval practices; he is 
also the Dean of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University.
Considering historic incidents and events, Stavridis’s analysis is based on his personal 
experiences, especially in an official capacity in the field of geopolitics and maritime security. 
Therefore, the value of this volume is twofold; it serves as a personal memoire of his navigation as 
a naval oﬃcer and provides a geopolitical perspective of the world’s oceans in terms of American 
naval strategy. The leitmotif of this book pertains to the geopolitical questions regarding various 
oceans and seas that emerged during the author’s service as a US naval oﬃcer in maritime areas. 
The answers to the questions, therefore, include a mixture of the author’s personal and practical 
experiences and his academic knowledge and scholarship.
The volume elaborates on the characteristics and signiﬁcance of the Paciﬁc Ocean, Atlantic 
Ocean, Indian Ocean, Mediterranean, South China Sea, Caribbean, and Arctic Ocean, with a chap-
ter devoted to each one. In the last two chapters, Stavridis explores the current issues that the world 
maritime order must face: (?) crimes in and on the oceans, such as piracy, and (?) US naval strategy 
to maintain peace and stability of the world’s oceans. The author depicts the size and location of 
each ocean in comparison with the surface area of the US, giving a real image of the vast maritime 
space of an ocean to the reader by referring to the names of cities and geographical features of 
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the country. In the book, the author proposes a national strategy and concrete plan for US foreign 
policy about the world’s major maritime areas mentioned above. In addition, every chapter in the 
book contains two sets of thematically contrasting maps — old and current — depicting land and 
sea elevations and ﬁsheries, with geopolitical and cartographic connotations.
In the twenty-ﬁrst century — the Age of the Paciﬁc — , the Paciﬁc Ocean (Chapter ?), where 
the arms race is real and dangerous, has a smaller risk of clashes between China and a US-led bloc 
of nations than in the Cold War era (despite some challenges and tensions in the South China Sea 
and Korean Peninsula), if and when a mechanism to put transparency, cooperation, and diplomacy 
in place functions.
The Atlantic Ocean (Chapter ?), as the world’s second largest ocean after the Paciﬁc, is rich 
in the history of the Vikings, the Age of Great Navigation, the New World Exchange, the American 
Revolution, the Napoleonic Wars, the First and Second World Wars, and the Cold War, and has 
been a zone of real conﬂicts between the US and European nations. This scenario is attributed to 
maritime technological transformations (e.g. shipbuilding techniques and telegraph cables). Now, 
there is a zone of cooperation and peace extending from the Arctic to the Antarctic Ocean.
The Indian Ocean (Chapter ?) has been characterised primarily as zone of trade (notorious 
for slavery and piracy), with less geopolitical signiﬁcance and history; it contains the Arabian Gulf 
and Red Sea as the inland seas connecting the West and the Islamic world. After the British de-
parture from the South Asian subcontinent after the Second World War, the Indian Ocean incurred 
the greatest risk of danger from confrontations between India and Pakistan over nuclear weapons. 
Therefore, the US will need to play a more important role in the Indian Ocean in this century in 
light of the geopolitically critical factors in this region, such as the rise of India, the fault line be-
tween the Sunni and Shi’a worlds, and counterpiracy operations.
Historically, the Mediterranean Sea (Chapter ?) — both a cradle of Greek, Roman, and 
Christian civilisations and an unforgiving arena of war at sea — will continue to be a sea of con-
ﬂict because of its geopolitical conditions, represented by Russia’s resurgence in the Black Sea, 
the ﬂow of refugees through the Balkans and Turkey, and the threat from Libya to Italy, or the ‘soft 
underbelly of Europe’ (Winston Churchill). Stavridis stresses the collaborative operations of the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the United States in the Mediterranean region to 
diminish threats from the Islamic State and the ﬂow of illegal migrants and refugees.
Since the arms race in East Asia continues to raise tensions in the South China Sea (Chapter 
?), a highway and sea lane for world trade, the international community will need to encourage 
military-to-military direct contact, hold governmental conferences as well as foster private sector 
engagement, promote collaborative operations of noncombat operations, and utilise negotiating 
platforms for the settlement of territorial disputes. The United States must retain a presence in the 
area through a network of bases and access agreements in the littoral states and consider the South 
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China Sea as a crucial zone of maritime activity in order to confront a rising China, if necessary. 
In the Caribbean Sea (Chapter ?), where a natural ‘tropical silk road’ connects all economies 
and a tourist industry with Europe despite the overhang of colonialism, the United States must 
pursue a strategy for ﬁghting corruption and violence in the region, bearing American responsibili-
ties originating the Monroe Doctrine and cooperating with regional partners, organisations, and 
the private sector.
Regarding the Arctic Ocean (Chapter ?), its future may be as a zone of cooperation (best), a 
zone of competition (probable), or a zone of real conﬂict (possible but less likely); therefore, the 
United States, by taking an interagency approach and building more icebreakers, needs to remain a 
leader collaborating with NATO and enhancing the dialogue with Russia on commercial and navi-
gational issues.
In the ‘Outlaw Sea’ (Chapter ?), a destructed maritime situation caused by signiﬁcant chal-
lenges, such as illicit activities (e.g. piracy and overﬁshing) and environmental damage (e.g. cli-
mate change, oil pollution, and resource exploitation), the United States is ought to enhance the 
level of international maritime cooperation through domestic (interagency) coordination in public 
and private sectors and intergovernmental collaboration (e.g. United Nations organisations) under 
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).
In the ﬁnal chapter, the author proposes a naval strategy for America in the twenty-ﬁrst cen-
tury, following and modifying the basic theory of Rear Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan that national 
power derives from engagement via the world’s oceans along the three key vectors of a state (pro-
duction, shipping, and colonies and alliances) and some principal conditions (geography, actual 
size of the seacoasts, nautical characteristics of the nation, and the character of government). As a 
maritime nation, the United States depends heavily on the open ﬂow of free goods in the oceans as 
open ‘global commons’ and needs a strong network of alliances and partnerships globally, accom-
panied by a high level of private-public operational integration and cooperation. On the basis of 
the analysis made in previous chapters regarding the world’s oceans, the author speciﬁcally stress-
es the need for updating and implementing a national maritime strategy and providing a roadmap 
for the maintenance of national security and assurance of all-domain access (air, sea, land, space, 
and cyberspace domains) throughout the entire world.
The book under review, reﬂecting a US maritime strategy from the author’s viewpoint, is, to 
a certain degree, updated by covering some outstanding current local issues such as China’s mari-
time expansionism, North Korea’s nuclear missile programmes, and other global challenges, such 
as piracy and environmental damage. Despite its unorthodox style for a monograph in this ﬁeld (i.e. 
with scant footnotes and relatively thin academic references), Stavridis’s personal experience as 
a naval oﬃcer — under the strong and deep inspiration of Mahan’s seminal work on the notion of 
sea power — vividly re-evaluates the traditional American idea of the ‘island state’ in the context 
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of the current geopolitical and geostrategic contexts.
US Freedom of Navigation Operations are, for Stavridis, necessary measures allowed under 
the law of the sea to cope with China’s rise and unilateral claim in the Paciﬁc Ocean, whereas 
international cooperation in anti-piracy measures taken against Somali pirates is within the realm 
of conventional maritime order historically arising from common interests. The theme and conclu-
sion of Stavridis is balanced and consistent: considering its own geopolitical conditions and those 
of the world’s oceans, the United States must remain a sea power with a maritime strategy and 
cooperate with its allies and partners. As the Obama administration unequivocally admitted, the 
United States no longer polices the world; nowadays, it demands international cooperation for the 
maintenance and stability of the current maritime order, regardless of President Donald Trump’s 
theme of ‘America First’.
In addition, Stavridis’s support of the early accession of the US to UNCLOS will certainly 
be echoed by others for enhancement of the law-abiding posture of the nation in favour of the Rule 
of Law, which is ﬁrmly shared by developed states, particularly when the United States criticises 
any maritime expansionist acts of China (e.g. in and around the South China Sea). Stavridis mis-
leadingly states that UNCLOS ‘came largely into force in the ????s’ (p. ???), but its oﬃcial entry 
took place on ?? November ???? because the deep seabed regime under UNCLOS was disputed 
principally by major developed states, including the United States. Under these circumstances, the 
United States would not enjoy the rights and privileges pertaining to such special regimes, includ-
ing deep seabed management, the continental shelf regime, and the International Tribunal for the 
Law of the Sea. Even though US maritime policy and strategy may be inevitably based on custom-
ary law, its non-party status with regard to UNCLOS will certainly hinder its holistic approach 
to maritime issues under Stavridis’s siren, ‘the sea is one’. Thus, this book serves as a warning 
against a self-centred maritime strategy by the United States with its unilateral and arbitral imple-
mentation.
It is also noteworthy to mention that Stavridis’s American approach to a geopolitical 
analysis and historic consideration of maritime powers may contrastively lure still thirsty readers 
to a British style of doctrinal classification and historic examination, possibly represented by 
Geoffrey Till’s Seapower: A Guide for the Twenty-First Century (Third Edition, Routledge, 
????) and Jeremy Black’s Naval Power: A History of Warfare and the Sea from 1500 (Palgrave 
Macmillan, ????), respectively. When Mahan wrote his The Influence of Sea Power Upon History 
1660-1783 (????), Pax Americana started to take over Pax Britannica. 
